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The Distributional Impact of Recurrent Immovable Property 
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Tsakloglou§ 
 
ABSTRACT  
During the last decade, Greece faced one of the most severe debt crises among developed 
countries, leading to Economic Adjustment Programs in order to avoid a disorderly default. 
Public expenditure was cut, tax rates were increased and new taxes were introduced aiming 
at restoring public finances. Prominent among the latter were recurrent property taxes that 
were playing a very minor role before the crisis. These taxes helped boosting public revenues 
but were hugely unpopular. The paper examines in detail their distributional impact and finds 
that they led to increases in inequality and (relative) poverty. The result is stronger in the case 
of inequality indices that are relatively more sensitive to changes close to the bottom of the 
distribution and poverty indices that are sensitive to the distribution of income among the 
poor. 
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1. Introduction 
During the period 1995-2007 Greece’s average growth rate was 3.9% per annum; second only 
to Ireland among the Eurozone countries and 1.5% above the Eurozone mean. However, 
Greece’s growth model was based primarily on the expansion of consumption and was largely 
financed by the inflow of external funds. Even though Greek banks were not directly exposed 
to American subprime bonds, when the economic recession following the Lehman Brothers 
collapse erupted, the deficiencies of this model became apparent. In 2008 output stagnated 
and in 2009 the economy moved into full recession. Internal and external imbalances that 
were steadily growing in earlier years deteriorated sharply and the economy faced enormous 
“twin deficits”(in the general government budget and the current account); the deficit in the 
current account exceeded 15% of GDP in 2008 and the budget deficit was over 15% in 2009. 
In 2010, Greece was cut off from the international capital markets and had to rely on the help 
of her Eurozone partners and the IMF, through three Economic Adjustment Programs that 
lasted for eight years (2010-2018) in order to avoid a disorderly default.5 
 
Source: AMECO 
In the framework of these programs, Greece agreed to rebalance its public finances through 
both expenditure cuts and tax increases. As shown in Graph 1, before the Economic 
Adjustment Programs, Greece’s share of taxes in GDP fluctuated around 33%, far below the 
EU average (close to 39%). In the years of the Economic Adjustment Programs, Greece’s share 
 
5 Ioannides and Pissarides (2015), Tsakloglou et al. (2016) and Meghir et al. (2017) provide accounts of the 
Greek crisis. 
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Graph 1. Tax revenues share of GDP: 
Greece and EU28 (2006-2016)
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of taxes in GDP rose rapidly and stabilized above the EU average, close to 41%. During this 
period, almost all tax rates were increased, while new taxes were introduced. As a result, the 
share of all types of taxes in GDP (direct taxes, indirect taxes, social insurance contributions 
and property taxes) rose, as shown in Graph 2. Regarding property taxes, although their share 
in GDP is small, it rose markedly after the introduction of a new property tax in 2011.  
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
As Mirrlees et al. (2011, p. 368) point out “Most taxes nowadays are levied on flows of income 
and of expenditure. But land and property have been taxed for centuries—certainly for longer 
than income—and they continue to form an important part of the tax base in most advanced 
economies”. Property taxation and especially, the taxation of land, has been popular among 
economists mainly on efficiency grounds. Following Ramsey (1927), Diamond and Mirrlees 
(1971) show that this type of taxation causes far fewer distortions that other types of taxes, 
particularly since it affects minimally labour supply decisions and hence, ceteris paribus, can 
be considered as a tool to maximize production and welfare. Moreover, due to the immovable 
nature of real estate, property taxation is usually associated with high rates of collectability, 
making it popular among policy makers (Cabral and Hoxby, 2012). 6 
However, in most cases property taxes are hugely unpopular among the members of the 
general population (Norregaard, 2013). Mirrlees et al. (2011) conjecture that this 
unpopularity may be due to the fact that since in most countries income and consumption 
 
6 Moreover, property taxes can also be used as policy tools in order to manage urban density, land use and 
housing market prices as well as speculation and “bubbles” in real estate and, thus, economic cycles. 
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Graph 2. Taxes as shares of GDP: Greece 2006-2016
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taxes are withheld at source and remitted to the government by firms, for the majority of the 
population, property taxes may be the single or the largest taxes they are asked to pay directly 
personally. Further, there is evidence that a considerable proportion of the population thinks 
that it is unfair to tax housing property (Lyons, 2007) particularly since, at least in the short 
run, these taxes are independent from someone’s current income and, hence, ability to pay 
(Slack and Bird, 2014). This unpopularity may be mitigated in cases where property taxes are 
local taxes and are somehow considered as “service charges” to the local community, thus 
collectively increasing local property values (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989). 
However, in most cases property taxes are hugely unpopular among the members of the 
general population (Norregaard, 2013). Mirrlees et al. (2011) conjecture that this 
unpopularity may be due to the fact that since in most countries income and consumption 
taxes are withheld at source and remitted to the government by firms, for the majority of the 
population, property taxes may be the single or the largest taxes they are asked to pay directly 
personally. Further, there is evidence that a considerable proportion of the population thinks 
that it is unfair to tax housing property (Lyons, 2007) particularly since, at least in the short 
run, these taxes are independent from someone’s current income and, hence, ability to pay 
(Slack and Bird, 2014). This unpopularity may be mitigated in cases where property taxes are 
local taxes and are somehow considered as “service charges” to the local community, thus 
collectively increasing local property values (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989). 
The expected distributional incidence of property taxes depends on the tax base (primary 
residence only, all housing, industrial buildings, agricultural land, other land types, etc), the 
tax rates applied both within and across types of real estate as well as the tax relief measures 
applied. In general, it was expected that since property is a form of capital and capital is more 
concentrated than income, the redistributive effects of property taxation should be 
progressive (Aaron, 1974). However, empirical studies in several countries show that usually 
property taxes constitute a higher fraction of the income of lower rather than higher income 
deciles7, thus increasing rather than reducing inequality; see, for example, the results of Kim 
and Lambert (2009), Davis et al. (2009) and Joumard et al. (2012) for the United States, 
Chawala and Wannell (2003) and Palameta and Macredie (2005) for Canada and Joumard et 
al. (2012) for the United Kingdom. On the opposite side, Marical (2009) reports that, due to a 
number of generous income- and family-related tax reliefs, recurrent taxes on immovable 
property in France are marginally progressive. In the case of Greece, although the 
contribution of these taxes to the stabilization effort of the economy was significant, their 
distributional effects have not been investigated yet. The present research aims to fill this 
gap. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of 
property taxation in Greece in a comparative perspective vis-à-vis other EU countries. Section 
3 presents the data and methods used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 contains the 
 
7 Throughout the text, the term “decile” denotes “decile group” rather than “decile point”. 
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empirical results on the distributional effects of recurrent immovable property taxation in 
Greece. Section 5 provides the conclusions. 
 
2. Immovable property taxation in Greece 
Traditionally, immovable property taxation in Greece was relying on non-recurrent taxes 
(taxes on transactions, inheritances and in-vivo transfers of immovable property). Usually, 
such taxes were accounting for around 0.4%-0.5% of GDP. Before the 2000s, several attempts 
to introduce recurrent property taxation were unsuccessful mainly due to lack of property 
valuations. In the 2000s, with a proper valuation system in place covering most parts of the 
country, a number of attempts to introduce such taxes under various schemes took place, the 
most important of which were: the Unified Real Estate Duty (ETAK), the Tax on Large Real 
Estates (FMAP) and the Municipal Real Estate Duty (TAP). Nevertheless, as shown in Graph 3, 
the revenues raised from these schemes remained very low (between 0.1% and 0.2% of GDP). 
The picture changed dramatically during the crisis, under the urgent need to increase 
revenues. In 2011, the Emergency Special Duty of Buildings Connected to the Electricity Grid 
(EETHDE) was introduced. The tax was applied only to buildings, both private households and 
firms were eligible for payments and, in order to reach a high collectability rate, it was 
collected through electricity bills.8 In 2014, the Unified Real Estate Property Tax (ENFIA) 
replaced EETHDE and was extended to the possession of land. On top of this, a supplementary 
tax was introduced for individuals with total taxable property value over 200,000 euros 
(covering the top 8% of the distribution of natural persons), aimed to introduce some 
progressivity to the scheme. Moreover, reduced rates applied to some of the most vulnerable 
population groups. Since 2014, changes in the level of tax have taken place mainly in order to 
introduce further tax deductions for vulnerable groups and gradual deleverage with 
successive horizontal tax rate deductions in the most recent years. 
 
8 The tax was introduced in late 2011 and the tax bill could be paid in installments. Most units eligible to the 
tax paid part of it in 2011 and part in 2012. For this reason, in Graph 3 only part of the effect of the 
introduction of the tax is recorded in 2011. 
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Source: Hellenic Ministry of Finance, General Accounting Office 
As shown in Graph 3, after the introduction of EETHDE and, especially, ENFIA, the share of 
recurrent immovable property taxes in national income shot up, reaching 2.0% of GDP. 
Collectability rates were high. For example, according to the General Accounting Office data 
for 2018, the collectability rate of ENFIA was 84%.9 At the same time, due to the crisis, real 
estate transactions declined sharply leading to a fall in non-recurrent property tax revenues 
as a share of GDP and recurrent taxes accounted for the lion’s share of property taxes. 
The recurrent taxes introduced in the period under consideration were assessed at the 
individual level and the tax base for the calculation of the tax was the taxable value of each 
asset. This, in turn, was determined mainly by the (administratively assessed) value of the 
geographical zone of the real estate asset. A major problem with the assessment of these 
taxes was that during the crisis property market values declined by over 40% (Bank of Greece, 
2019, Table II.6), while their taxable values remained unchanged. The problem was further 
complicated because Greece lacks a complete cadastral and the re-assessment of detailed 
taxable values would have been a very hard exercise given the low number of transactions in 
the real estate market during the crisis. This is a usual drawback of real estate taxes in practice 
in many countries. As Almy (2014) points out, valuation practices frequently ignore 
revaluation requirements, which almost by definition occur in periods of rapid recession or 
growth. This lack of revaluation can enhance the perception of taxpayers that property taxes 
may be unfair. It should be noted that these taxes were introduced close to the peak of the 
 
9 The corresponding rate for the non-withheld part of personal income taxes was 77% and even lower for 
indirect taxes. 
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Greek crisis. Output was down by 26%, the rate of unemployment was above 27%, while the 
disposable income of the average household was 42% below its peak (Andriopoulou et al., 
2018). Unsurprisingly, the new tax was hugely unpopular and, according to many 
commentators, contributed to the downfall of the, then, government in the 2015 elections. 
Graphs 4 and 5 compare Greece with the EU countries with respect to revenues collected 
through property taxation.10 Graph 4 shows that until 2010 Greece was lagging behind the 
European average in terms of the share of property taxes in GDP. The gap can be attributed 
exclusively to the difference in the share of taxes collected through recurrent taxes. After 
2010, though, the picture changes completely. Due to the introduction of EETHDE and, then, 
ENFIA, the share of both recurrent and total property taxes in Greece’s GDP exceed the 
European average by a wide margin; in the last year under consideration in Graph 4, the 
differences are 1.1% and 0.6% of GDP, respectively. 
Graph 5 shows that in 2017 Greece’s share of property taxes in GDP was the fourth highest in 
the EU (behind France, the UK and Belgium), while in terms of the share of recurrent property 
taxes in GDP, only two countries were collecting higher revenues than Greece (France and the 
United Kingdom). Furthermore, Greece’s share of property taxes in total taxes collected 
(8.0%) is substantially higher than the corresponding mean EU figure (6.0%) (European 
Commission, 2019). 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
10 These graphs refer to property taxation in general; not only immovable property taxation. However, in all 
countries the latter is the main component of property taxation. 
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Source: European Commission (2019) 
 
Finally, before moving to the empirical results, a few words on changes in inequality and 
poverty in Greece during the period under consideration are needed. Despite the dramatic 
changes in living standards of the Greek population during this period, the evidence of Graph 
6 that reports intertemporal changes in the Gini index and the poverty rate when the poverty 
line is set at 60% of the median equivalized income of the contemporaneous distribution 
suggest that the changes in inequality and poverty were not that large.  Both of the indices 
remained substantially higher that the EU averages in Greece during this period, rose in the 
early years of the Economic Adjustment Programs following the sharp increase in 
unemployment rate and declined in the later years. Nevertheless, detailed analysis using 
inequality indices that are more sensitive than the Gini index to changes close to the tails of 
the income distribution (especially the bottom end of the distribution) and poverty indices 
that are sensitive to the depth of poverty as well as the distribution of income among the 
poor in Andriopoulou et al. (2018; 2020) records stronger changes in inequality - although the 
pattern is similar to that of Graph 6 - and very considerable rises in poverty using “floating” 
and, especially, “anchored” poverty lines. Interestingly, unlike what is often heard in the 
Greek public discourse, the elderly improved their relative position while there was 
substantial deterioration in the relative position of the enlarged group of the unemployed, 
who swelled the ranks of the poor. 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
E
st
o
n
ia
L
it
h
u
an
ia
S
lo
v
ak
ia
C
ro
at
ia
C
ze
ch
 R
ep
u
b
li
c
S
lo
v
en
ia
R
o
m
an
ia
A
u
st
ri
a
B
u
lg
ar
ia
G
er
m
an
y
Ir
el
an
d
C
y
p
ru
s
L
at
v
ia
M
al
ta
H
u
n
g
ar
y
S
w
ed
en
F
in
la
n
d
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
P
o
la
n
d
P
o
rt
u
g
al
L
u
xe
m
b
o
u
rg
E
A
-1
9
It
al
y
D
en
m
ar
k
E
U
-2
8
S
p
ai
n
G
re
ec
e
B
el
g
iu
m
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
g
d
o
m
F
ra
n
ce
Graph 5. Property taxes as shares of GDP in EU28: 2017
Recurrent property taxes Other property taxes
9 
 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
3. Data and methods 
The data used in the paper are drawn from the Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 
(SILC) for Greece. We use SILC waves 2007 to 2017, corresponding to income years 2006 to 
2016. The data set contains information on property taxes paid. The information appears to 
be very reliable. For example, in 2017 the sum of recurrent property taxes reported in SILC 
was 2.3 billion euro, while the total reported by the tax authorities was 2.7 billion euro.  
However, the latter figure also includes recurrent property taxes paid by firms as well as 
households. 
Due to the complexity of income surveys, such income data become available with a 
considerable delay. For instance, the EU-SILC 2020 survey data (reporting incomes earned in 
2019) will not be released before 2022. Tax-benefit microsimulation models can fill this gap, 
providing timely estimates of the effects of changes in taxes and benefits on the income 
distribution (Figari et al., 2015). In order to assess the distributional impact of changes in 
property taxation in the most recent years (i.e. 2017, 2018 and 2019), we make use of the 
Greek component of EUROMOD, the tax-benefit microsimulation model of the EU.  
EUROMOD is a tool that enables researchers to estimate in a comparable way the effects of 
taxes and benefits on the income distribution. The model simulates personal tax and social 
insurance contribution liabilities as well as cash benefit entitlements for all EU countries 
based on the national tax-benefit policy rules of a given year and the information available in 
the underlying microdata. The components of the tax-benefit systems that cannot be 
30.0
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Graph 6. Intertemporal changes in Poverty Rate (AROP, lhs) 
and Gini Index (rhs), Greece and EU28, 2006-2016
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simulated are taken directly from the data, along with information on original incomes. 
EUROMOD has been validated both at micro and macro level and has been extensively used 
to address a broad range of economic and social policy questions (Sutherland and Figari, 
2013). One of the most important advantages of EUROMOD is attribution; the model allows 
researchers to isolate the effects of each policy, taking into account the complex ways in 
which policies interact with each other.  
In this paper, EUROMOD’s underlying microdata are drawn from SILC 2017. Updating incomes 
and non-simulated benefits from 2017 to 2019 is carried out using factors based on available 
administrative or survey statistics. Specific updating factors are derived for each income 
source, reflecting statutory rules or the change in the average amount per recipient between 
the income data reference period and the target year. In order to enhance the credibility of 
our estimates, an effort has been made to address issues such as tax evasion and benefit non 
take-up.11 It should be noted that the estimates of inequality, poverty and progressivity 
indices reported below using EUROMOD are not strictly comparable with the estimates 
derived using SILC data. The differences in the simulated results and the results derived from 
SILC can be attributed primarily to the simulation of several benefits in EUROMOD that are 
severely under-reported in SILC data (Tammik, 2019). When these corrections are made in 
EUROMOD, the incomes of a number of poor households rise and the corresponding 
estimates of inequality and poverty indices are lower than those derived from SILC. Therefore, 
these estimates are shown primarily in order to identify trends in recent years that SILC data 
are not available. 
For the period 2017-2019, the applicable property tax is ENFIA. As noted earlier, it consists of 
two parts: the primary and the supplementary. The primary tax is computed based on an 
elaborate formula which, amongst other parameters, takes account of the cadastral value of 
the property, its surface, use and age as well as the floor it is located at. There is also a social 
provision which grants discounts of 50% or 100% on the tax assessed to taxpayers with low 
family income, families of 3 or more dependent children, or with members suffering serious 
disabilities. The supplementary tax is applicable for taxpayers with properties whose cadastral 
values exceeding €200,000. The value of ENFIA is reported in SILC.  However, since SILC 
provides no information on properties’ cadastral values, the policy is switched off in the 
baseline and the tax for 2017-2018 is taken directly from the input data (only minor changes 
were implemented in these years). However, in 2019 ENFIA was reduced by 10%-30% 
depending on the cadastral value of the property.12 This reduction is simulated in EUROMOD. 
In order to approximate properties’ values we used the average cadastral values for urban 
and rural/semi-rural areas according to tax data provided by the Greek authorities (i.e. €1,338 
 
11 Detailed information about each of these issues as well as validations against external sources are available 
in the EUROMOD Country Reports for Greece: https://www.euromod.ac.uk/using-euromod/country-reports/  
12 By 30% when the total cadastral value of the properties was below 60,000 euros, by 27% if it was between 
60,000 and 70,000, by 25% if it was between 70,000 and 80,000, 20% if it was between 80,000 and 1,000,000 
and 10% if it was above 1,000,000 euros. 
11 
 
per square meter for those residing in urban areas and €745 per square meter for those 
residing in rural/ semi-rural areas).  
For the calculation of inequality, poverty and progressivity indices as well as for the 
classification of the population members in particular decile groups, we used the member’s 
equivalized household disposable income. This is the sum of all incomes of all household 
members net of income taxes and social insurance contributions (and, when needed, 
property taxes) divided by the household equivalence scale. The latter is the one used by 
EUROSTAT that assigns 1 to the household head, 0.3 to each household member aged below 
14 and 0.5 to each of the remaining household members. 
 
4. Empirical results 
Recurrent immovable property taxes per capita over time are shown in Graph 7 along with 
their share in household disposable income. For the first years of the period under 
examination, the recurrent property taxes in per capita terms are close to zero, while the 
introduction of ETAK in 2009 led to marginal increases. However, the introduction of EETHDE 
in 2011 increased sharply the amount of tax individuals paid from €15 on average in 2010 to 
€175 in 2012. Two years later, when EETHDE was replaced by ENFIA, the corresponding figure 
rose further, reaching a maximum of €225 in 2015. Since then, property taxes per capita 
started to decline due to reductions of cadastral values in many areas across the country and 
the introduction of tax exceptions for a number of vulnerable population groups. A similar 
picture emerges for the share of recurrent property taxes in total household disposable 
income (gross of recurrent property taxes). Starting from close to 0% in 2006, households 
were called to pay a bit less than 4% of their disposable income a few years later, in 2014.  
12 
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Graphs 8i, 8ii and 8iii depict the level of recurrent property taxes per capita for each decile, 
when the population members are ranked from the poorest to the richest. For the sake of 
brevity, we present estimates for three years out of the whole period under examination. 
These years are 2007, 2012 and 2016 and are representative of the pre-crisis years and the 
years of “maturity” of EETHDE and ENFIA, respectively. For the majority of the population 
these taxes were zero in 2007. Even for the richest decile, the annual figure per capita was 
below 15 euro. On the contrary, in 2012 and 2016 all deciles pay substantial amounts and the 
mean payment per decile rises continuously as we more from the poorest to the richest decile 
(with minor exceptions between the fifth and the sixth decile in 2012 and second and the 
third decile in 2016).  Mean per capita payments range between 84 (113) euro for the bottom 
decile to 361 (420) euro for the top decile in 2012 (2016). 
Prima facie, the evidence of Graphs 8i, 8ii and 8iii could imply that the redistributive effect of 
the tax is progressive. However, to validate such a statement, we have to look at the tax as a 
share of distribution of disposable income per decile including the property tax (pre-tax 
distribution). The corresponding evidence is reported in Graphs 9i, 9ii and 9iii. The picture 
that emerges is anything but progressive, at least for 2012 and 2016. As expected, in 2007 the 
shares for all deciles are close to zero. In 2012, the share of the tax in the income of the 
bottom decile is 6.8%, declining almost progressively up to the top decile where it is 2.3%. 
The corresponding shares for 2016 are even higher; 8.5% and 2.9%, respectively. To some 
extent, these results may be attributed to the fact that during the crisis a number of property-
owning households became jobless, while long-term unemployment soared. Unemployment 
protection in Greece is quite inadequate, for the long-term unemployed it is almost non-
existent, while in the years under consideration there was no benefit of last resort in the form 
a minimum income guarantee scheme. Hence, many households in the bottom decile had 
very limited monetary resources, while the taxable value of their real estate assets was not 
so low and, as a result, the decile ratio of taxes to disposable income was high. All in all, the 
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Graph 8iii. Property taxes per capita by decile (€): 2016 
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evidence of these graphs provides a very strong indication that the incidence of the recurrent 
property taxes introduced during the crisis was regressive.13 
  
 
13 This statement is in line with the vast majority of similar studies treating inequality and progressivity in 
relative terms.  However, there is a strand of literature where inequality and progressivity remain unchanged if 
the incomes of all population members change by the same amount (instead of the same proportion), 
(Blackorby and Donaldson, 1980 and 1984). Using this approach, the evidence provided so far would point to 
the opposite direction, i.e. progressivity, since in absolute terms the property taxes paid by the rich are larger 
than those paid by the poor. 
15 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
%
Deciles
Graph 9i. Property taxes as share of  pre-tax 
disposable income  by decile, 2007 
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
%
Deciles
Graph 9ii. Property taxes as share of  pre-tax 
disposable income  by decile, 2012 
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
%
Deciles
Graph 9iii. Property taxes as share of  pre-tax 
disposable income  by decile, 2016 
16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
c
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
 o
u
tc
o
m
e
 p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
0 20 40 60 80 100
population percentage (ordered by dpi_enfia)
Lorenz_Disp.Income Concentration_Property Taxes
Graph 10i.Lorenz and concentration curve: 2007
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
c
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
 o
u
tc
o
m
e
 p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
0 20 40 60 80 100
population percentage (ordered by dpi_enfia)
Lorenz_Disp.Income Concentration_Property Taxes
Graph 10ii.Lorenz and concentration curve: 2012
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
c
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
 o
u
tc
o
m
e
 p
ro
p
o
rt
io
n
0 20 40 60 80 100
population percentage (ordered by dpi_enfia)
Lorenz_Disp.Income Concentration_Property Taxes
Graph 10iii.Lorenz and concentration curve: 2016
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Graphs 10i, 10ii and 10iii go a step further and show the Lorenz curves of the distribution of 
pre-tax equivalized income and the concentration curves of recurrent property taxes for the 
three years under consideration. The grey area around the concentration curves is the 5% 
confidence interval for the corresponding points of the curves. In general, since tax is a 
negative income component, if the tax concentration curve lies above (below) the Lorenz 
curve of the pre-tax income distribution, the Lorenz curve of the post-tax income distribution 
is likely to lie below (above) the pre-tax Lorenz curve. Some interesting observations can be 
made. In 2007 the concentration curve lies below the Lorenz curve, implying that the property 
taxes of that year were progressive (the top 5% of the distribution paid almost 40% of the, 
admittedly very low, total amount of the tax). However, the wide band of the confidence 
interval implies that safe conclusions are hard to draw. On the contrary, in both 2012 and 
2016 the concentration curves lie above the Lorenz curve and the confidence intervals are 
pretty narrow. This is another indication that the post-tax distribution of income is likely to 
be more unequal than the pre-tax distribution. 
 
Graph 11 depicts progressivity indices for all the years under examination. Estimates for the 
period 2006-2016 are derived directly from SILC data, while EUROMOD-based estimates are 
provided for the years 2016-2019. Naturally, the simulated estimates of EUROMOD do not 
coincide with those observed in the sample in 2016, but the differences are quite low. 
Estimates of two indices of progressivity (and redistribution) are shown in the graph. The first 
is the index of Kakwani (1977), which essentially measures departures from proportionality 
and takes values between -1 and 1; the larger the value of the index is, the more progressive 
is the social intervention. However, this index is not affected by the size of the corresponding 
transfer. Estimates of the index are reported on the right vertical axis of the graph. The second 
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
-0.006
-0.004
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Graph 11. Reynolds-Smolenski (lhs) and Kakwani (rhs) 
Progressivity Indices (2006-2019)
R - S (SILC) R - S (EUROMOD) Kakwani (SILC) Kakwani (EUROMOD)
R-S 
Index
Kakwani
Index
18 
 
index is that of Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) which, essentially, measures the difference 
between the Gini coefficient of the pre-tax income distribution and the Gini coefficient of the 
post-tax income distribution. It also takes values between -1 and 1 and the larger its value, 
the higher the progressivity of the social intervention. Unlike the former index, this index is 
sensitive to the size of the transfer. The index of Kakwani has a rather erratic pattern until 
2010 but, in general classifies the redistributive effects of the property taxes in the early years 
as progressive. On the contrary, the Reynolds-Smolensky index for the same period is always 
very close to zero, implying that the impact of the tax on measured inequality was negligible. 
For the period after the introduction of EETHDE and ENFIA, both indices move to negative 
territory, implying that the property tax reforms of that period were regressive. It is 
interesting to note that in the final year under consideration, when proportional cuts to ENFIA 
were introduced, the Kakwani index hardly moves, while the Reynolds-Smolensky index 
records a decline in regressivity (the estimated value of the index increases from -0.047 to -
0.033). 
 
Inequality indices were calculated both for the distribution of disposable income including 
property taxes (pre-tax distribution) and for the distribution of disposable income net of 
property taxes (post-tax distribution). The corresponding proportional changes in the 
estimates of the inequality indices due to recurrent immovable property taxes for each year 
are depicted in Graph 12. For the purposes of the graph, we use the Gini index and three 
members of the parametric family of Atkinson (1970) indices. In comparison to other indices 
of inequality, the Gini index is relatively more sensitive to changes close to the middle of the 
income distribution (Cowell, 2000). In the case of the Atkinson index, the inequality-aversion 
parameter is, successively, set at 0.25, 0.50 and 0.75. Ceteris paribus, the higher the value of 
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the inequality-aversion parameter, the more sensitive the index is to changes close to the 
bottom of the distribution. The evidence of Graph 12 shows that the effect of property 
taxation on the distribution of disposable income for the period 2006-2010 was very close to 
zero. In the following years the effect is negative and, in fact, the changes in inequality indices 
become increasingly larger between 2010 and 2015. In 2016 the impact is again inequality-
increasing, but the effect is smaller than that of 2015. The change in the value of the Gini 
index as a result of the immovable property tax reforms (1.6% at the maximum) is smaller 
than the increase recorded in the Atkinson indices (between 4.6% and 5.8% at the peak). It is 
worth noting that the higher the inequality-aversion parameter of the Atkinson index the 
larger the proportional change in the value of the index. The changes in the estimates of 
inequality indices recorded using EUROMOD for 2016 are smaller than those recorded in the 
original SILC data, but the relative ranking of the indices remains the same. According to the 
evidence of Graph 12, for the period 2016-2019, the impact of recurrent property taxation 
remained regressive, but the policy changes introduced is these years moderated its 
inequality-increasing impact. 
 
Finally, the effects of these taxes on relative poverty are assessed in Graph 13. For the 
purposes of this graph, the poverty line is not held constant but is always set at 60% of the 
median income of the corresponding income distribution. Three members of the parametric 
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) (FGT) family of poverty indices are exploited for the purposes 
of this graph: the headcount ratio, FGT(0), that measures the proportion of the population 
falling below the poverty line, but is not sensitive to the severity of their poverty; FGT(1) that 
is the product of the headcount ratio and the average poverty gap (distance between the 
poverty line and the mean income of the poor divided by the poverty line); and FGT(2) that 
measures the product of the head count ratio by the squared poverty gap and, thus, unlike 
FGT(0) and FGT(1), is sensitive to the distribution of income among the poor. The results 
reported in Graph 13 are largely similar to those of Graph 12. Minimal changes in the indices 
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until 2010; in most cases increasingly larger rises in relative poverty between 2011 and 2015 
and a smaller increase between 2015 and 2016 (at least for FGT(2) whose value in 2015 
increases by more than 12% as a result of recurrent property taxes - the pattern of the other 
two is not entirely clear); the higher the poverty-aversion parameter of the index the larger 
the recorded proportional change in relative poverty; changes in the estimates of the poverty 
indices in 2016 lower when simulated data used instead of the original SILC data. However, 
the simulations of EUROMOD suggest that unlike the changes recorded in inequality indices 
for the period 2016-2018, the poverty-increasing impact of recurrent property taxes rose 
during this period. For the last year under examination, the poverty-increasing effect of 
property taxes declines according to FGT(0) and FGT(1) but remains stable according to 
FGT(2). Nevertheless, it is clear that the reforms in the field of recurrent property taxation in 
the years of the Economic Adjustment Programs increased relative poverty. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The paper aimed to examine the distributional impact of recurrent property taxation in 
Greece. Until a few years ago, recurrent property taxation was playing a minimal role in the 
Greek tax system. In the middle of the recent severe crisis, a new scheme of recurrent 
property taxation was introduced, initially covering only buildings connected to the electricity 
grid, but later extended to all types of real estate. The new tax had high collectability, boosted 
public revenues and helped substantially the fiscal stabilization effort of the country. In line 
with the experience of several other countries, this tax was also hugely unpopular.  
Our results show that the distributional effect of the tax was clearly regressive. Although, on 
average, in absolute terms richer households paid higher recurrent property taxes than 
poorer households, the ratio of the tax to the pre-tax disposable income was substantially 
higher in the case of poorer households. As a consequence, ceteris paribus, inequality and 
(relative) poverty indices rose after the imposition of the tax. The result was stronger in the 
case on inequality indices that are relatively more sensitive to changes close to the bottom of 
the distribution and poverty indices that are sensitive to the distribution of income among 
the poor. Recent policy changes proportionately reducing the tax mitigated these effects. 
However, carefully designed tax relief may be needed if the aim is to keep the amount of tax 
revenues collected constant and at the same time neutralize its adverse distributional impact. 
Yet, taking into account that the “grey economy” is extensive in Greece (Kelmanson et al., 
2019), the link of property taxation with income criteria should be tackled with care in order 
to avoid increasing incentives for tax evasion. 
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